The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in a 5-4 decision that federal law does not prevent states from counting absentee ballots that are postmarked on or before Election Day but arrive up to five business days later. This ruling reverses a Fifth Circuit decision and upholds Mississippi’s practice of counting such ballots.
Background of the Case
The case, Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State v. Republican National Committee et al., centered on Mississippi’s absentee voting rules. The state allows certain residents, including college students away from home and senior citizens, to vote absentee in federal elections. Ballots must be postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five business days after the election.
The Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, and individual plaintiffs sued Mississippi election officials, arguing that federal statutes preempt Mississippi’s law. The plaintiffs contended that the word “election” encompasses both the casting of ballots and their receipt by officials, so the federal deadline for the “election” also bars counting ballots received after Election Day.
Majority Opinion
The majority, led by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, concluded that “nothing in the federal election-day statutes requires ballots to be received by election day.” The Court emphasized that the defining element of an “election” has always been the electorate’s choice of candidate, which occurs when voting is complete, not when ballots physically arrive.
The Court also pointed to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which requires states to allow absent military and overseas voters to cast absentee ballots and creates a federal backup system. UOCAVA treats ballot receipt deadlines as a matter of state law, suggesting that federal election-day statutes do not impose a uniform national receipt deadline.
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority’s decision removes a traditional safeguard against voter fraud. The dissent noted that concerns about fraud were a leading reason for enacting the federal election-day statutes in the first place.
The dissent maintained that the decision is inconsistent with the text of the election-day statutes, two centuries of historical practice, contemporary election-law principles, and relevant case law. It warned that the decision opens unresolved questions for state officials and courts and risks further undermining public confidence in elections and self-government.
Original reporting: Must Read Alaska (Anchorage) — read the source article.