Los Angeles County officials are taking swift action after an independent UL Research Institute inquiry highlighted serious shortcomings in the response to the 2025 Palisades and Eaton wildfires. The report, commissioned by Governor Gavin Newsom, documented communication failures, fragmented command structures, and tactical errors that left many residents without timely evacuation orders.
Key findings of the UL investigation
The Palisades Fire, which burned 23,448 acres across coastal Los Angeles and Malibu, claimed 12 lives and destroyed 6,833 structures. The Eaton Fire, covering 14,021 acres in the Pasadena‑Altadena area, resulted in 19 deaths and the loss of 9,419 structures.
Paramedics and sheriff deputies in West Altadena observed severe ember storms and burning homes hours before broader alerts were issued, but because they operated outside the fire command structure, their observations never reached incident leaders. Consequently, most West Altadena residents did not receive mandatory evacuation orders until the fire had already overtaken the community.
The Los Angeles County Fire Department’s incident command center at the Rose Bowl was reportedly disorganized and unaware that the fire had moved westward until daylight hours. In the Palisades incident, the Los Angeles City Fire Department failed to re‑inspect a smoldering site in Topanga State Park despite warnings, and its commanders lacked experience with large, complex wildfires. Additionally, the Los Angeles Police Department and the fire department operated on separate tracks, using conflicting evacuation maps.
These coordination gaps led to 26 fire units deploying independently without proper command approval. Conditions began to improve only after Cal Fire assumed control of incident operations on January 8, 2025.
County response and next steps
Los Angeles County Supervisor Kathryn Barger called the findings “serious” and urged a thorough review. In an email to The Center Square, Barger said, “Eaton Fire survivors, especially those who lost loved ones, deserve accountability and confidence that every lesson from this tragedy will result in meaningful change.” She promptly introduced a motion, approved by the Board of Supervisors on October 6, directing an immediate comparison of the UL report with the county’s existing after‑action reviews to identify gaps and determine additional actions.
“While we can’t change what happened on January 7, we have an obligation to learn from it and ensure our emergency response systems emerge stronger and ready for when the next disaster strikes,” Barger added.
Survivor perspective
Joy Chen, co‑founder of the Every Fire Survivor’s Network, expressed frustration that the government continues to issue reports rather than fix the problems. Chen described how residents relied on a community WhatsApp group to share fire sightings and coordinate volunteer bucket brigades, noting, “That’s not our job. That’s our government’s job. That’s why we pay taxes.”
Chen also highlighted ongoing challenges for survivors, including delayed insurance payouts and displacement. She warned that two‑thirds of fire survivors remain displaced, with many facing depleted retirement savings and maxed‑out credit cards.
Looking ahead
The county’s comparative review aims to align the UL findings with existing after‑action reports, pinpointing specific reforms such as integrating paramedic and sheriff observations into the incident command system, standardizing evacuation maps across agencies, and ensuring experienced leadership for large‑scale wildfires.
Community groups like the Every Fire Survivor’s Network are also stepping in, collecting data on insurer misconduct and preparing an insurance scorecard to hold companies accountable. Their efforts, combined with county‑level reforms, aim to strengthen emergency preparedness and protect families from future disasters.
Original reporting: KTBS 3 (Shreveport) — read the source article.
